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It is hard to dispute the judgment of Princeton scholar and former 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Dr. Tom Christensen that “China’s 
return to great power status is perhaps the most important challenge 
in twenty-fi rst century American diplomacy” (Christensen 2015, p. 1). 
Because of China’s decades of rapid economic growth, and its invest-
ment of that growth in expanding its diplomatic and military power, 
there are now very few issues in U.S. diplomacy in which China does 
not play a major role. During meetings between Chinese Communist 
Party General Secretary Xi Jinping and President Obama, notably their 
2015 Washington Summit and their 2016 meeting during the Nuclear 
Security Summit, the two leaders have wrestled with important issues 
of cooperation—such as climate change and responding to North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile tests—while confronting equally 
important issues of competition and confrontation—such as territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea and threats to cyber security (Tanner 
2016). 
This chapter explores fi ve underlying factors in the U.S.-China rela-
tionship that pose particularly strong challenges for the United States:
 1) China’s rapidly expanding national interests and its increasing 
power to assert and protect them,
 2) China’s governance problems and their challenge to cooperation,
 3) China’s thinking about security and the challenge of building 
U.S.-Chinese “strategic trust,”
 4) the challenge of mobilizing U.S. allies and partners, and
 5) the challenge at home.
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CHINA’S RAPIDLY EXPANDING NATIONAL INTERESTS 
AND BEIJING’S POWER TO ASSERT THEM
Driving the emergence of many new or deepening challenges in 
U.S.-China relations has been China’s expanding national security 
interests—both within its region and globally—and Beijing’s grow-
ing capacity to assert or protect them. China’s emerging interests result 
mainly from its three decades of sustained economic growth and expand-
ing economic, diplomatic, and military power. China’s leadership, at 
its core, remains committed to an established set of long-standing, key 
security interests—most notably protecting Chinese Communist Party 
rule, maintaining social stability, sustaining economic and technologi-
cal growth, and protecting China’s national unity, sovereignty, and 
territorial integrity. But the front lines of these existing interests are 
expanding beyond East Asia, and China has increasingly demonstrated 
its growing concern over at least six emerging arenas of national secu-
rity interest (Tanner and Mackenzie 2015): 
 1) Maintaining energy security, especially access to petroleum 
and natural gas through the Indian Ocean region and Russia 
and Central Asia.
 2) Protecting China’s expanding overseas investments and the 
millions of expatriate Chinese workers in unstable environ-
ments abroad.
 3) Asserting and protecting China’s expanding maritime security 
interests—its territorial and resource claims in the South China 
Sea and East China Sea, and its access to trade, investments, 
and resources in “distant seas” regions via strategic lines of 
communication, such as Malacca, the Persian Gulf, the Horn 
of Africa, and increasingly the Arctic.
 4) Protecting China’s increasing economic, security, and domes-
tic stability concerns along its west-southwest borderland 
regions, which are predominantly populated with ethnic and 
religious minority groups. These interests include China’s con-
cerns over long-running waves of Uyghur and Tibetan social 
discontent, but also China’s strategic relations with India, Pak-
istan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Central Asia, and China’s ongo-
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ing plan to establish a new “Silk Road” of trade and invest-
ment ties.
 5) Advancing and protecting its communications security and 
military security interests in the space and cyber realms.
 6) Helping to secure a stable global environment conducive to 
China’s sustained development.
For the past decade, China has been engaged in a major internal 
discussion of how it conceives and prioritizes these interests, includ-
ing debates over which interests the country can now aff ord to assert 
and protect, something it has never been able to promote in the past. 
Related are discussions of how to develop and employ new strategies, 
tactics, and resources to assert and protect these interests—including 
diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, administrative, cyber/informa-
tional, intelligence, and military resources. As one part of this, the Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) doctrinal writers have been hard at work 
with China’s leaders establishing what the role of the military should 
be, and how and in what ways the PLA should extend its previous mis-
sions of deterrence, border defense, and internal security to assert and 
protect China’s emerging interests abroad.
Many of the most sensitive issues that have taken center stage in 
recent U.S.-China summits, bilateral dialogues, and multilateral meet-
ings have been driven not only by enduring Chinese security interests 
but also by China’s desire to assert and protect these emerging security 
interests. These include 
• reported Chinese cyber espionage cases, most prominently, the 
reported massive theft of data from the Offi  ce of Personnel Man-
agement records;
• China’s increasing use since 2009 of maritime law enforcement, 
administrative, military, land reclamation, investment, and other 
means to assert its still not well-defi ned sovereignty and resource 
claims in the disputed areas of the South China Sea; 
• the increasingly diffi  cult environment for U.S. businesses in 
China, especially the legal pressure on foreign high-tech fi rms to 
permit government access to proprietary technology and client 
records; and 
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• human rights issues, including widespread detentions of human 
rights attorneys and the arrests of Chinese Uyghurs as part of a 
crackdown on ethnic separatism, extremism, and social violence.
China’s expanding interests also defi ne a large and growing num-
ber of arenas in which the United States and China share overlapping 
but not necessarily identical interests that also make the relationship’s 
challenges increasingly complex. The range of issues on which the two 
countries actively cooperate continues to widen along with China’s 
global presence. In the past several years, as part of the countries’ signa-
ture cooperative dialogue—the Strategic and Economic Dialogue—the 
U.S. State Department has released a list of more than 100 dialogues 
and other joint projects or endeavors in which China and the United 
States consult and cooperate. The list truly runs the full range of secu-
rity, environmental, trade, fi nancial, homeland security, and other areas, 
and involves engagement across nearly every consequential govern-
ment agency in both countries. Two noteworthy fi rsts from 2015 illus-
trate this trend:
 1) The PLA Navy, at the invitation of the U.S. Pacifi c Command, 
for the fi rst time took part in the world’s largest biennial naval 
exercise, the Rim of the Pacifi c exercise (RIMPAC), along 
with the United States, Japan, India, and many other countries. 
 2) Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson became the fi rst 
Department of Homeland Security secretary to visit China, 
where he met with Chinese representatives and spoke at the 
Chinese People’s Public Security University, China’s leading 
police staff  college.
CHINA’S GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS AND THE 
CHALLENGE TO COOPERATION
Another complex challenge for the U.S.-China relationship is that 
China’s economic and political linkages around the world are so expan-
sive that, for many global issues, it is not suffi  cient just to have China’s 
public support to address key international problems. Increasingly, Chi-
na’s international partners, including the United States, must also work 
The United States and the China Challenge   19
with Beijing to urge it to develop and strengthen its governance institu-
tions and policy-implementing capacities, and get China to demonstrate 
sustained resolve in actively supporting and enforcing a wide array of 
international solutions. 
U.S. offi  cials who deal with China fi nd that all too often, even if 
leading authorities in Beijing nominally support certain international 
norms, agreements, or arrangements, China’s capabilities to enforce, 
implement, or oversee its commitments may be inadequate. These gov-
ernance and implementation problems may be suffi  cient to hold back 
or undercut international security or enforcement arrangements or other 
agreements. Notwithstanding the acquiescence of national authorities 
in Beijing, Chinese local offi  cials, state companies, or Chinese mar-
ket trends often control more than enough resources or capabilities to 
undermine some international problem-solving eff orts, as long as Bei-
jing does not, or cannot, actively and eff ectively enforce its international 
commitments. This is a challenge with respect to a wide range of issues 
in U.S.-Chinese cooperation and can occur through many channels. 
For example, Chinese corporate actors knowingly—or even uncon-
sciously—may sell technology and components to troublesome inter-
national actors in disregard of international eff orts to cut off  these 
fl ows. In 2015, the United States and China resumed their dialogue on 
counterterrorism. One of the central U.S. concerns was urging China to 
study and pursue international best practices in controlling the precur-
sor chemicals, materials, and technologies for manufacturing impro-
vised explosive devices, in part to prevent the possibility that China’s 
vast computer and chemical industries might become conduits for these 
items fi nding their way to extremist groups in countries on or near 
China’s borders. Despite strict on-paper regulations for the handling 
of dangerous chemicals, Chinese authorities do not believe that these 
regulations are often enforced adequately—a fact that was horrifi cally 
underscored by the tremendous chemical warehouse explosion that 
took place in the port of Tianjin on August 12, 2015, claiming at least 
173 lives. Chinese local offi  cials, moreover, often have far less power-
ful incentives to enforce regulations on goods that merely exit, or transit 
through, their areas of jurisdiction. 
In another example, Chinese state companies have the fi nancial 
capacity to undermine international sanctions regimes through their 
continued purchase of a target country’s exports. In 2015, for example, 
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a critical step in enforcing the economic sanctions against Iran and its 
nuclear program was persuading China and its state petroleum compa-
nies to temporarily cut their purchases of petroleum from Tehran. Lurk-
ing behind the recent U.S. debate over whether to support the nuclear 
weapons deal with Iran is the issue of whether China (as well as Rus-
sia, India, and other major economic actors) would actively support 
renewed economic sanctions in the event that U.S. offi  cials called for 
resuming negotiations with Iran. 
The United States and other Chinese partners continue to work with 
China to “foster the growth of the ineff ectual Chinese inspection safety 
bureaucracies” regarding food, consumer products, pharmaceuticals, 
and many other products exported from China (Christensen 2015, p. 1). 
The United States lacks the capacity to inspect all incoming products 
from China, which raises the importance of building Chinese bureau-
cracies that can strengthen inspections at the factory.
The United States and China’s other economic partners also have a 
stake in China developing more secure, transparent, and stable fi nancial 
markets. In this respect, a disturbing aspect of China’s summer 2015 
stock market collapse was Chinese authorities’ reported use of police 
investigations, threats, harassment of traders, and attacks against jour-
nalists for “rumor mongering” to quell the market downturn.
Active Chinese central government support for, and creation of, bet-
ter intellectual property institutions in China are essential for protecting 
not only U.S. patent holders but also Chinese inventors and innovators. 
And while these issues are some of the oldest and most enduring U.S. 
institutional interests in governance reform, they have been pushed into 
the background by mounting reports of systematic theft of U.S. foreign 
corporate intellectual property by state organizations, including Internet 
theft.
Finally, China’s passage in 2016 of a law regarding the manage-
ment of foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is also likely 
to undermine some of the most important private institutional means 
for actors from the United States and China’s other partners to pro-
mote improved governance in China on environmental and many other 
issues. In 2015, U.S. offi  cials on multiple occasions had called for Chi-
nese offi  cials not to adopt tough new regulations that would harm the 
ability of U.S. and other foreign NGOs to promote better governance 
and social services in China.
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THE CHALLENGES OF BUILDING U.S.-CHINESE 
“STRATEGIC TRUST”
For many years, Chinese interlocutors—when asked how best to 
strengthen the U.S.-China relationship—have often told their U.S. part-
ners that the two great powers need to “overcome strategic mistrust” or 
“build strategic trust.” Typically, this call for developing strategic trust 
has been accompanied by lists of actions that the United States should 
take that demonstrate respect for China’s core national security inter-
ests. These proposed actions often relate to rethinking the U.S.-Asian 
alliance structure, ending U.S. reconnaissance fl ights near China’s ter-
ritory, decreasing U.S. support to allies and partners locked in tensions 
with China (recently, in the South China Sea), or lifting restrictions on 
U.S. technology sales to China.
Notwithstanding these calls for U.S. actions to promote “strategic 
trust,” Chinese offi  cials and analysts, in their writings and interactions 
with U.S. experts, often mix together at least three schools of thought 
about the United States’ strategic motivations for U.S. actions in the 
region. These philosophies suggest to this author that many in China’s 
elite will likely struggle to embrace a sense of strategic trust toward the 
United States, even if it were to make a number of the requested conces-
sions to Chinese interests. 
The fi rst school of thought draws on China’s sense of historical 
grievance about its mistreatment by Western powers, including the 
United States, during its century of semicolonial humiliation.
The second comes from realist or neorealist thinking about interna-
tional relations theory—a very strong version of “power transition the-
ory,” which assumes that established powers such as the United States 
will be strongly committed to preventing the emergence of rising pow-
ers. Some Chinese analysts appear to see this forecast of power transi-
tion theory not merely as a theoretical cautionary tale, but as an inevi-
table historical-empirical fact that has a major impact on U.S. thinking 
and strategy toward China. Many appear quick to interpret a wide array 
of U.S. activities—from the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and Paki-
stan, to the U.S. rebalance to Asia, to the Trans-Pacifi c Partnership, and 
human rights advocacy—as being about China, and as tools in a U.S. 
eff ort to contain China in a network of adversaries. These assumptions 
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about transitional tensions are certainly a motive for one of Xi Jinping’s 
signature policy initiatives—U.S. approval of what China calls a “new 
type of great power relationship” between the two countries.
The third school of thought refl ects some enduring aspects of 
Leninist thinking: these include a strong faith that the Chinese Com-
munist Party as an organization is uniquely qualifi ed to strengthen 
China and its governance and achieve the “China dream.” A concern 
remains that the United States and the world’s liberal democratic pow-
ers are not merely aspiring to keep China strategically contained as a 
power—they ultimately aspire to weaken China by bringing down its 
party-state system, and return China to its self-perceived “sheet of loose 
sand” weakness of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In par-
ticular, this thinking has been discernible in China’s reaction to waves 
of uprisings against authoritarian governments in many other regions of 
the world—most notably during the 1989–1992 collapse of European 
Leninism, during the Eurasian “colour revolutions” of 2000–2005, dur-
ing the Arab Spring uprisings since 2011, and also in U.S. policy toward 
authoritarianism in countries such as Burma, Thailand, and Sri Lanka. 
The Arab Spring in particular caused a surprisingly strong “fl inch” 
among Chinese Communist Party leaders, who were concerned that 
social media could further heighten unrest in China, and who responded 
with a strong assertion of “social management” systems. 
These three schools of thought raise questions about whether the 
challenges of building strategic trust with China are going to be sig-
nifi cantly more diff erent and diffi  cult than might be the case with other 
emerging powers—powers whose visions of international relations 
are more narrowly entrenched with traditional realist competitions 
over greater and lesser international power, and less so with their own 
individual historical-cultural concerns or global competitions between 
regime types. 
Beyond its potential impact on strategic trust, this third Leninist 
turn of thought among Chinese leaders and analysts also appears likely 
to raise challenges to smooth future U.S.-China relations in another 
area. This concerns the rise over the past 10–15 years of China’s eff orts 
to protect the stability of the Chinese Communist system not only on 
Chinese soil but also increasingly on the sovereign soil of other coun-
tries, including the United States. There have been several reported 
manifestations of this trend: 1) Beijing’s insistence that other countries 
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repatriate, extradite, or deport Chinese citizens or noncitizens facing 
politically tinged charges such as corruption, as well as ethnic and reli-
gious minorities fl eeing China; 2) China’s pressure on other countries 
not to meet with Uyghur or Tibetan rights activists (including of course 
the Dalai Lama); and 3) China’s apparent increase in the past 15 years 
of political security investigations abroad by public security and state 
security offi  cers, such as investigation and research outside the border, 
or “Operation Foxhunt.” 
THE TASK OF MOBILIZING U.S. ALLIES AND PARTNERS
A colleague of mine identifi es two opposite approaches to U.S. 
policy toward China and its position in Asia: 1) to get policy toward 
Asia right, you fi rst need to get policy toward China right, and 2) to get 
policy toward China right, you fi rst need to get policy toward Asia right.
Mobilizing U.S. relationships with regional allies and strengthening 
relations with emerging regional partners are the most important chal-
lenges facing the United States in its dealings with China—especially 
allies such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia, non-
ally partner Taiwan, and partnerships such as India, Vietnam, Indone-
sia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Recent Chinese behavior in the South 
China Sea—notably its land reclamation eff orts, oil exploration, and 
maritime law enforcement operations inside and beyond the Nine-Dash 
Line—have all created great new opportunities to enhance cooperation 
with many of these allies and partners in responding to assertive or 
aggressive Chinese behavior. But managing tensions in the relations 
between allies or partners remains a challenge—for example, bilateral 
tensions between Tokyo and Seoul over territorial disagreements and 
historical issues relating to World War II and Japanese occupation. 
Being strategic and selective in the management of these partner rela-
tions remains a challenge for U.S. policy. U.S relations with Japan, for 
example, involves continuing to reaffi  rm U.S. treaty commitments to 
Tokyo, lauding Japan’s positive role as a force for peace, development, 
and security in the region since WWII, and supporting its potential for 
expanded security cooperation under the Abe administration policies. 
But U.S. offi  cials have also judged that eff ective management of its ties 
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with Japan as part of the United States’ East Asia strategy has at times 
required distancing itself from, for example, some Japanese leaders’ 
views of Japan’s WWII conduct, which are still major sources of ten-
sion in relations with China, South Korea, and other Asian countries. 
The United States will also have to continue to strike a balance 
between signaling a joint resolve among the United States and its allies 
and partners to protect common interests in response to Beijing’s asser-
tive behavior, attempting to reassure Beijing that the continued alliances 
and partnerships are not aimed at undermining or encircling China, 
and continuing to search for new areas where the United States and its 
allies can enhance nontraditional security cooperation with China in the 
region on issues such as counterpiracy, antiterrorism, and humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief.
THE CHALLENGE AT HOME
Finally, when considering U.S. policies toward China and East Asia, 
it is necessary not only to “get China right” and “get Asia right” but also 
to get right several major policy issues here in the United States. A solid 
long-term policy toward a rising China will also require more focused 
U.S. attention to China in mass media, classrooms, and elsewhere—
discussion that goes beyond an oversimplifi ed debate over “China as 
partner/China as adversary.” U.S. policy has long noted explicitly that 
the China-U.S. relationship will inevitably combine cooperation and 
competition. How the United States pursues politics at home has a 
major impact on its capacity to engage, cooperate with, and compete 
with China, and to work with its allies and partners to promote and pro-
tect regional interests. As one important example, the long-term mod-
ernization and development of U.S. Navy capabilities, which are criti-
cal to securing U.S. and allied interests in the region, require a stable, 
long-term approach to budgetary politics. Chinese analysts make note 
of tensions and obstruction in U.S. governance, and there is evidence 
to indicate that they interpret it as an important indicator of future U.S. 
capacity and commitment as a power in the Asia-Pacifi c. 
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Note
This chapter is based on remarks made at the 2015–2016 Werner Sichel Lecture Series 
at Western Michigan University, September 23, 2015. As with the original talk, the 
views in this chapter are entirely those of the author, and not necessarily those of the 
CNA Corporation, its corporate offi  cers, or its sponsors. The author is deeply grate-
ful to the WMU Economics Department and the Light Center for Chinese Studies for 
sponsoring this work.
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